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Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure
Helen Norton'
Those opposing campaign disclosure and disclaimer requirementsI on
First Amendment grounds have largely focused on such requirements'
potential for inhibiting speakers' expressive choices and thus their
autonomy. 2 Too often overlooked in these debates, however, are such
disclosure requirements' potential for enhancing listeners' autonomy
interests - i.e., listeners' ability to make choices that maximize their own
preferences free from manipulation by others.3 In this essay, I suggest that
we can sometimes understand a political speaker's interest in anonymity or
pseudonymity as an interest in keeping a secret and occasionally even in
telling a sort of lie about her identity. Such secrets and lies threaten
listeners' autonomy interests when the speaker seeks to keep such secrets
(and sometimes seeks to tell such lies) to enhance her ability to influence
her listeners' decisions.
For these reasons, I suggest greater attention to the reasons speakers
seek to keep secrets (or occasionally tell such lies) in assessing the First
Amendment implications of disclosure and disclaimer requirements in a
range of campaign, commercial, professional, and other contexts. As a
doctrinal matter, such a focus might helpfully inform our choice of the
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado
School of Law. Thanks to John Jeffries, Fred Schauer, the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection
of Free Expression, and the editorial staff of the Journal of Law and Politics for a terrific symposium.
Thanks too to Deborah Cantrell, Danielle Keats Citron, Leslie Kendrick, and Rick Lee for insightful
comments, and to Rick Lee and Jessica Smith for outstanding research assistance.
1In this paper, I use the term campaign "disclosure" requirements to refer to required disclosure of
contributors' financial support for political candidates or causes. By campaign "disclaimer"
requirements, I refer to required identification of the source of political advertisements or related
communications in support of or opposition to political candidates or causes.
2 See, e.g., William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election
Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 859, 878-79 (2011) ("[I]ndividuals engage in political activity in
part to fulfill their own search for truth and meaning, and disclosure impedes their freedom to do so.").
3Here I separate instrumental First Amendment interests in facilitating citizens' participation in
democratic self-governance from dignitary First Amendment interests in protecting individual
autonomy. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF.
L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (separating various First Amendment interests for analysis).
Here, too, I adopt Joseph Raz's concept of autonomy - as he explained, "to be author of one's life,
one's choices must be free from coercion and manipulation by others." JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 372 (1980); see also David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment's
Protection ofSelf-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 75, 106 (forthcoming 2012) (describing a vision
of autonomy "based on the simple and deeply rooted anti-paternalist principle that each person is
entitled to a limited sphere within which she is free from external coercion or interference . . . .").
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appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to such disclosures - for
example, we might be less suspicious of disclosure requirements designed
to protect listener autonomy than those motivated by other governmental
purposes. Such a focus might also (or instead) help determine whether a
contested disclosure requirement survives a specific level of review,
depending on the justifications offered by both challenger and government.
In short, this essay contends that disclosure and disclaimer requirements
should be understood as least troubling for First Amendment purposes
when applied to speakers who seek to keep secrets or tell lies to manipulate
their listeners' decision-making.
I. SECRETS, LIES, AND DISCLOSURE ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL
What, more specifically, do I mean by "secrets" and "lies" in this
context? First, political speakers who resist campaign disclosure or
disclaimer requirements would prefer to keep secret from their listeners
either the identity or the intensity of their support for a candidate or cause.
Second, some speakers seek to use pseudonyms that disguise the source of
political contributions or communications, and such pseudonyms are
occasionally sufficiently deceptive that we might at times even think of
them as a type of lie. The Supreme Court, for example, has recognized this
dynamic:
Because FECA's disclosure requirements did not apply to
so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used
misleading names to conceal their identity. "Citizens for
Better Medicare," for instance, was not a grassroots
organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but
was instead a platform for an association of drug
manufacturers. And "Republicans for Clean Air," which
ran ads in the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, was
actually an organization consisting of just two
individuals-brothers who together spent $25 million on
ads supporting their favored candidate.4
In other words, we might think about those fighting disclosure and
disclaimer requirements as seeking to keep their identity a secret - and
4McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 128 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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occasionally even to tell a sort of lie about their identity through potentially
misleading pseudonyms.s
Of course, neither secrets nor lies are always bad,6 much less illegal,
and in many contexts the First Amendment prohibits their regulation. But
in thinking about when secrets and lies are (or should be) regulated through
disclosure and disclaimer requirements, we might helpfully focus on the
various reasons why speakers may seek to keep their identity secret or
sometimes even tell a type of lie about their identity. These reasons vary in
the threats they pose - or do not pose - to listener autonomy.
To be sure, sometimes speakers seek to conceal - or keep secret -- their
identity for very good reasons. For example, because a political speaker's
reasonable fear of retaliation is a legitimate justification for such secret-
keeping, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment does not
permit the application of campaign disclosure requirements to those who
can show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure will
subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government
officials or private parties." 7 We should be slow, however, to indulge
contemporary speakers who seek to draw parallels to the NAACP's
experience in Alabama in the 1950s when resisting the state's efforts to
force disclosure of its membership.8 There, not only was the government's
interest in disclosure unusually pernicious - as Alabama sought the
NAACP's membership lists as part of its efforts to drive the organization
from the state entirely9 -- so too was the targets' experience of harassment,
which included violence and even death. 10
5 For additional examples of such pseudonyms, see THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER,
LEGISLATIVE ISSUE ADVERTISING IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 20 (2005) (listing sampling of issue
advertisers with "ambiguous or potentially misleading names," including "Americans for Balanced
Energy Choices," a coalition of mining companies, coal transporters and electricity producers
advocating for coal-based electricity; "Citizens for Asbestos Reform," a coalition of insurance
companies advocating for limits on asbestos-related tort claims; and "Partnership to Protect Consumer
Credit," a coalition of retailers and credit card companies opposing regulation of the credit industry).
6 David Strauss, for example, has explained in another context how speakers' different reasons for
telling lies pose very different costs to listeners' autonomy. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion,
Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 355 (1991) ("[T]here is a difference
between lies that are manipulative and false statements made for different reasons. False statements that
are not manipulative lack the element of control and domination. An inadvertently false statement, for
example, or a false statement made solely for the purpose of protecting a confidence, is less
objectionable because it does not involve the same degree of manipulation as a false statement made
for the purpose of influencing behavior or thought.").
7 See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820-21 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
8 For an example suggesting such a parallel, see David Marston & John Yoo, Political Privacy
Should be a Civil Right, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl0001424052748704132204576284630941397792.html.
9 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63, at 222
(1988) (describing Alabama's efforts as the "pioneer action" among "twenty-five separate lawsuits
2012] 643
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But sometimes speakers seek to keep their identity secret for very
different reasons - and for reasons that I think are less worthy of First
Amendment protection. For example, some political speakers seek to shape
their listeners' voting behavior by denying those listeners information
about the source of the message or of the candidate's (or cause's) financial
support" -- information that is not only indisputably true but also of great
interest and value to listeners.12 In other words, some speakers seek to keep
such secrets precisely because they think that making such truthful
information available to listeners will limit their ability to influence their
listeners' choices." Of course, these speakers often very much want their
challenging [the NAACP's] right to operate in the South, most of them filed by hostile states and
municipalities").
'n See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) ("Petitioner has made an uncontroverted
showing that on past occasions revelation of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to
economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's
Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue
their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may
induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear
of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this
exposure."); see also Protect-Marriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(concluding that the plaintiffs could not show that a movement to define marriage as limited to that
between a man and a woman "is vulnerable to the same threats as were socialist and communist groups,
or, for that matter, the NAACP").
" Just as private speakers do, government speakers sometimes try to conceal or mask their identity
to improve their messages' ability to influence listeners. See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency,
and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1009 (2005); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1017 (1995); Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law With a
Twist: When Government is the Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2011).
12 A significant body of evidence suggests that reliance on heuristics may enable comparatively
uninformed voters to vote as "competently"-to vote in a way consistent with their own policy
preferences-as comparatively well-informed voters. See, e.g., James N. Druckman, Does Political
Information Matter?, 22 POL. COMM. 515, 515 (2005) (summarizing a study finding that "citizens can
compensate for a lack of political information by using shortcuts to make the same decisions they
would have made if they had that information"); Heather Gerken, Lobbying as the New Campaign
Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1160-62 (2011) ("We all know why shortcuts like disclaimers
matter: we are familiar with the problem of the low-information voter. We all know that voters do not
know a huge amount about the fine-grained details of policy proposals. So what do they do? They rely
on shortcuts like the words 'Democrat' or 'Republican' which stand, in a pretty sensible way, for a
larger set of policy positions. Shortcuts are what enable voters to make sensible policy decisions when
they vote. And disclaimers and disclosures are shortcuts. They offer a signal to the voter about how to
process the information in question."); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring
Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus", 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1161
(2003) ("[Rleliance on heuristic cues is a learned practice based on past success and accuracy. Voting
behavior in candidate elections, when heuristic cues are readily available, is relatively rational,
consistent, and well-ordered . . . . Even if they do not cure voter confusion in every instance, voters
armed with heuristic cues will be much more likely to vote competently in the face of complexity than
will voters without them.") (footnote omitted).
13 See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Commentary, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1592-93
(1999) ("Many of the groups that succeed in getting initiatives on the ballot have primarily economic
motives-e.g., insurance companies, lawyers, and teachers' unions. To make matters worse from an
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identities known to the recipients of their contributions. So here, speakers'
interest in anonymity (i.e., in keeping secret their identity as the source of a
communication or contribution) is based not only on an interest in
protecting their own autonomy, but instead also on a strategic - and
arguably manipulative - interest in enhancing their ability to influence
others and thus perhaps intrude on their autonomy. 14
Secrets and lies of this sort can be seen as morally troubling from a
Kantian perspective because the speakers are using the listeners as a means
to the speakers' own ends, rather than treating listeners as ends in
themselves.15 Indeed, such secrets and lies can be seen as variant forms of
deception that are both manipulative and disrespectful - which is why most
of us generally prefer not to have secrets kept from us or lies told to us. As
David Strauss explained in another context:
[L]ying is wrong because it violates human autonomy.
Lying forces the victim to pursue the speaker's objectives
instead of the victim's objectives. If the capacity to decide
upon a plan of life and to determine one's own objectives
is integral to human nature, lies that are designed to
manipulate people are a uniquely severe offense against
human autonomy. . . . When a speaker tells a lie in order to
influence the listener's behavior, the metaphor of
commandeering the listener's mind, and making it serve
the speaker's ends instead of the listener's, seems
especially appropriate. The speaker really does inject her
informational perspective, these groups often adopt false, generic labels such as 'Committee for a Just
America' or 'Campaign for Consumer Justice.' . . . In an ideal world, information heuristics would
operate like warning labels on consumer items. In reality, those who sponsor initiatives know that
labels can be important, and they choose labels strategically in order to create images they think voters
will receive best."); Chris Chambers Goodman, (M)Ad Men: Using Persuasion Factors in Media
Advertisements to Prevent a "Tyranny of the Majority" on Ballot Propositions, 32 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 247, 257 (2010) ("The [organizations'] names are specifically designed, in some[] cases to
obfuscate, and these names of the supporters can be very influential in the outcome of the ballot
measure.").
14 See Steven Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36
FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) ("[T]he autonomy justification of free speech ... cannot explain why
society should protect one individual's autonomy if that autonomy will be used in a way that
undermines the autonomy of many other individuals who populate mainstream society. Those who
justify free speech by reference to individual autonomy usually describe the use of that protected
autonomy in positive ways, as if all individuals will use their autonomy in ways that contribute directly
to the growth and strengthening of the collective interests of society as a whole. In fact, we all
intuitively understand that this is often not the case.").
" See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63-65 (James W.
Ellington, transi., 3d ed. 1993).
2012] 645
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own false information into the thought processes of the
listener for the purpose of making those processes produce
the outcome that the speaker desires. 16
Although lies can be especially deceptive (and thus manipulative and
disrespectful), secrets can raise similar concerns as well. As Strauss further
observed, "Deliberately denying information . . . is not the same thing as
lying, but it is a form of attempting to control the audience's mental
processes.. . . [T]he difference is only one of degree; both a manipulative
denial of information and a manipulative lie invade the victim's
autonomy."17
I agree, and thus urge that we add an inquiry into why speakers want to
keep their identity secret to the factors that we consider when thinking
about disclosure requirements' First Amendment autonomy implications.
In other words, while we sometimes should protect speakers' anonymity as
a matter of protecting speakers' autonomy - i.e., their ability to express
themselves, to be who they are free from threats or harassment - we should
remain attentive to potential threats posed to listeners' autonomy by
speakers who instead seek to keep secrets and occasionally even tell lies to
influence listeners' decisions and shape their behavior to match the
speakers' preferences. 1
This analysis suggests that policy prescriptions and doctrinal analysis
distinguish a speaker's interest in keeping her identity secret because she is
vulnerable to abuse by power from a speaker's interest in keeping her
identity secret to better wield her own power to shape others' choices. In
another context, for example, Yochai Benkler characterized the distinction
16 Strauss, supra note 6, at 355, 366; see also Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First
Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108-
10 (2006) ("At first glance, restraining deceptive communication furthers rather than disrupts
enlightenment of the populace-by promoting truth. Moreover, other theories of the function of free
expression-especially theories of autonomy-tend to support government restrictions on deception, at
least when adopted to preserve the autonomy of those whom deceptive speakers otherwise might
manipulate.. .. [T]he most powerful argument in favor of government authority to restrict deception,
and the most powerful argument against government-imposed deception, are the same: the
manipulative, domineering, and fundamentally disrespectful invasion of autonomy worked by
deception.").
1 Strauss, supra note 6, at 356-57.
' See Gerken, supra note 12, at 1160-61 ("The way that the First Amendment works is that people
get to push back if you say something with which they disagree. It is one thing to say that if there is a
threat of violence-if someone is going to slash your company trucks' tires or throw a brick through
your store windows-that you are entitled not to have your expenditures disclosed. But it's not clear that
it is a cognizable injury under the First Amendment if someone stops buying your company's
product.").
646 [Vol.27:641
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between privacy and transparency as turning on a theory of asymmetric
power:
The core of the argument is that privacy is at risk when
there are powerful observers and vulnerable subjects.
Transparency, by contrast, involves disclosure of
information about powerful parties that weaker parties can
use to check that power of its abuse. When we say that an
act of information disclosure 'threatens privacy' or
'promises transparency' we are making a judgment about
who has power and who is susceptible to it and how that
power ought to be limited.' 9
Along the same lines and for similar reasons, Richard Briffault and
other thoughtful commentators have proposed that we target campaign
disclosure requirements to large, powerful, and well-financed speakers:
their size and resources suggest that they are less vulnerable to threats and
more capable of manipulating others.20
19 Yochai Benkler, The Real Significance of Wikileaks, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, May 10, 2011,
http://prospect.org/article/real-significance-wikileaks.
2o Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure after Citizens United and
Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 1005 (2011) ("By the very size of their financial
contribution, large donors are demonstrating an intense degree of support for a candidate, party, or
cause. Large donors are likely to be wealthier and therefore less vulnerable to economic reprisals than
small and middling givers. They are also more likely to be repeat participants and more used to public
attention to their donations. Moreover, they are seeking to use their wealth and intensity of commitment
to exercise a greater degree of influence over a collective, public decision than not only the vast
majority of voters, but also most other donors. . . . [A] more focused law would do a better job of
reconciling the competing constitutional values that ought to inform disclosure. Focusing on major
donors would protect the political privacy of smaller contributors and eliminate the disincentive to
making contributions that disclosure might cause while simultaneously protecting, and arguably
advancing, the voter-information purpose underlying disclosure."); see also McGeveran, supra note 2,
at 879-80 ("On the benefits side, public knowledge of single financial contributors or individual
signatories on a petition offers little helpful information to most voters, and provides minimal aid in
controlling corruption or enforcing other election laws. On the other hand, knowing about very large
donations that effectively bankroll a candidate or ballot initiative, or about organized entities
supporting a petition drive, would more likely provide valuable information to voters and perhaps bear
on corruption concerns. Courts have acknowledged this scale difference in some recent campaign
finance decisions where they diminished the weight of the state's informational interest in proportion to
the amount of money contributed or spent in political activity.").
I do not mean to suggest that large or powerful speakers can never establish "a reasonable
probability that the compelled disclosure will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from
either Government officials or private parties." See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Instead, I
emphasize the importance of assessing-rather than presuming-the reasons why a speaker seeks to keep
such secrets or tell such lies.
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II. SECRETS, LIES, AND DISCLOSURE IN OTHER CONTEXTS
As is the case in the campaign speech context, the autonomy costs that
speakers' secrets and lies sometimes impose on listeners are too often
overlooked in debates over contested disclosure and disclaimer
requirements in a variety of commercial, professional, and other settings.
In thinking about these controversies, again I urge attention to whether the
speakers' reason for resisting such required disclosures (i.e., their desire to
keep certain secrets or even tell certain lies) undermines listener autonomy
and whether the government's interest in disclosure thus furthers or
frustrates such autonomy.21
Governments require disclosure in different contexts for a variety of
reasons. First, government frequently requires speakers to make certain
disclosures to protect listeners from deception. The Supreme Court has
long held, for example, that the First Amendment permits government to
create disclosure requirements that "are reasonably related to the State's
interest in preventing deception of consumers." 22 To be sure, such
disclosure requirements are most commonly applied to potentially
deceptive commercial speech. 23 But given the threat that lies may pose to
listener autonomy more generally, we might understand government's
21 In addition to informing (and sometimes influencing) listener decision-making, the government's
disclosure requirements sometimes also seek to shape behavior by the regulated speakers. See Paula
Dailey, The Use and Misuse ofDisclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089 (2007).
22 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339-40 (2010) (upholding
federal statute requiring bankruptcy professionals to include certain disclosures in their advertisements
"to combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements - specifically the promise
of debt relief without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent
costs."); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985) (holding that disclosure requirements that are reasonably related to the state's interest in
preventing consumer deception do not violate commercial speakers' First Amendment rights).
Along the same lines, certain disclosure requirements also seek to expose potential conflicts of
interest in the commercial context. See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
(upholding federal law requiring disclosure of consideration received in exchange for publicizing
security for sale). The Court has similarly recognized the value of disclosures in illuminating potential
conflicts of interest in the campaign context. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976)
("[D]isclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing
large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage those who
would use money for improper purposes either before or after the election. A public armed with
information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election
special favors that may be given in return.").
23 See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality
of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENv. U. L. REV. 855, 868 (2010) ("[T]he
Court tends to accord more deference to government determinations that commercial speech may
mislead consumers when the regulatory means are mandated disclosure rather than restriction of
speech. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that disclosure requirements are less burdensome
alternatives to restrictions of commercial speech.").
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interest in protecting listener autonomy as weighty even outside of the
commercial speech context in circumstances where the speaker seeks to
shape listener behavior through deception.24
Second, government not infrequently requires certain speakers to make
factual disclosures to inform listeners' decision-making even in the
absence of deception by the speaker.25 Examples in the commercial context
include state and local laws requiring restaurants to disclose the caloric and
fat content of their offerings, 26 and the Federal Trade Commission's
various disclosure rules that require sellers to divulge information like their
24 As discussed above, disclosure requirements are most often, and least controversially, imposed
as an antidote to what would otherwise be regulable fraud in the commercial context. See supra notes
23-24 and accompanying text. Whether the First Amendment permits the regulation of fraud in the
political campaign context, however, remains unclear. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, False Campaign
Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 285, 287 (2004) ("Generally, deliberately false
statements have been held not to raise First Amendment concerns, while the dissemination of false
statements has been considered to be exceptionally damaging to the integrity of the electoral system.");
Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 914 (2010) ("On the
existing state of the law, therefore, a negligent or even non-negligent statement of a demonstrably false
fact about cigarettes, diet products, or securities, for example, could constitutionally ground a civil,
criminal, or regulatory remedy, but even a grossly negligent false statement about a candidate in an
election would seem to remain under First Amendment protection although several lower courts appear
to have adopted a narrower reading of Brown v. Hartlage and have consequently permitted state
election commissions to regulate for factual falsity."). That the First Amendment may not permit legal
remedies for fraudulent campaign speech may increase the value of disclosure and disclaimer
requirements to enhance the possibility that speakers can at least be held politically accountable when
they engage in such fraudulent speech.
25 See Jacobs, supra note 23, at 857 ("All of the current Supreme Court justices agree that
governments have the constitutional authority to require commercial speakers to publish some relevant
facts when the government purpose is to supplement advertising that would otherwise be false,
misleading, or have the potential to mislead consumers. But countering the potential for consumer
deception has never been the only purpose that disclosure requirements have served. Increasingly,
government regulators require disclosure along with commercial speech to counter the potential for
consumer persuasion as well.").
Note that the Supreme Court has suggested in dictum that that the First Amendment may permit
such disclosures only in the context of commercial speech. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian,
& Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573-74 (1995) ("[O]utside the context [of commercial
speech, the State] may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees.. .. [T]his
general rule . . . applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to
statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid."). But, as discussed infra, courts not infrequently
uphold factual disclosures outside of the commercial context under certain circumstances. See infra
notes 27-31 and accompanying text; see also Riley v. Nat'l Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 799 n.l I
(1988) ("[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser
to disclose unambiguously his or her professional status. On the contrary, such a narrowly tailored
requirement would withstand First Amendment scrutiny.").
26 See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2009); Nicole
Anderson, Would You Like Some First Amendment Rights with That? How Mandatory Nutritional
Disclosures on Restaurant Menus Violates the Freedom of Commercial Speech, 36 HASTINGS CoNST.
L.Q. 105 (2008); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 159 (2009). For additional examples,
see William Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999).
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products' mercury content or their automobiles' gas mileage. 27
Professional speech (i.e., speech by a professional to client or patient 28)
offers another context in which the law often requires disclosures even
absent a finding of deception - for example, by requiring medical
professionals to disclose facts sufficient to permit patients to make
decisions in a way that maximizes their autonomy. As Robert Post
explains, "[i]nformed consent doctrine mandates the communication of
medical knowledge to the end that a lay patient can receive the expert
information necessary to make an autonomous, intelligent and accurate
selection of what medical treatment to receive."29
Such governmental justifications for disclosure requirements parallel
those in the campaign speech context, in that all require speakers to make
truthful disclosures to facilitate listeners' ability to make choices that
maximize their own preferences and thus enhance their own autonomy. 30
Requiring disclosures of such objectively verifiable facts thus potentially
increases listener autonomy through more informed decision-making.31
27 See, e.g., Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding state
law that requires manufacturers of certain products with mercury to label their products and packaging
about the presence of mercury and the requirement to recycle or dispose as hazardous waste: "To be
sure, the compelled disclosure at issue here was not intended to prevent 'consumer confusion or
deception' per se, but rather to better inform consumers about the products they purchase. Although the
overall goal of the statute is plainly to reduce the amount of mercury released into the environment, it is
inextricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness of the presence of mercury in
a variety of products."); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial
Speech and Coerced Commercial Associations in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L.
REV. 555, 584-85 (2006) ("[C]ommercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons
that have little to do with the prevention of deception. The Federal Trade Commission now imposes
mandatory disclosure rules on a wide range of industries, requiring sellers to divulge such information
as 'the durability of light bulbs, octane ratings for gasoline, tar and nicotine content of cigarettes,
mileage per gallon for automobiles, or care labeling of textile wearing apparel.' Congress has passed
innumerable statutes that contain analogous disclosure requirements. These disclosure requirements
force commercial speakers to engage in commercial speech, but they do not do so merely to prevent
potential consumer deception. They primarily seek to reduce information costs and thereby to establish
a more educated and efficient marketplace.").
28 See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 (2007).
29
See id at 972.
3o In some of these contexts, moreover, the threat to speaker autonomy may be especially low.
Recall, for example, that the Court's commercial speech doctrine rests in part on the premise that the
costs to speakers' autonomy posed by regulation may be ameliorated by the "hardiness" of commercial
speech given the speakers' economic interests in continued speech. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). For an argument that the same may be true
of well-financed and highly-motivated political speakers, see Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech,
Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 797
(1999) (suggesting that those engaged in partisan political speech have the same very strong incentives
to speak as those engaged in commercial speech).
31 See Strauss, supra note 6, at 357 ("When the government prevents people from making decisions
on the basis of false information, it does not manipulate their mental processes to serve the
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Finally, and most troubling for First Amendment purposes, are
"disclosures" that require speakers to recite factually-contested material to
shape listeners' behavior in the government's preferred direction.32 Such
disclosures pose substantial threats to both speaker 3 and listener
autonomy because the speaker is required to say something that she may
not believe in an effort to shape the listeners' decision to match the
government's preferences. Examples here might include government
efforts to require a doctor to tell a patient considering abortion that she will
be terminating the life of a human being when such a characterization is
deeply morally contested, or to inform such a patient that abortion is
government's ends. Rather, it enables those processes to function as they should, to promote the ends of
the listener. Similarly, restricting speech in a way that effectively prevents a person from making ill-
considered decisions does not deny her autonomy in the way that lying to her does. It does not
manipulate the person and cause her to pursue the government's ends instead of her own. She remains
free to decide what she wants to do on the basis of reasoned discussion. Such a restriction on speech
may deny listeners something they value-people may enjoy being moved to impulsive action-but it
does not control the listeners by causing them to pursue the government's ends instead of their own.").
32 For an example outside of the abortion context, consider the Supreme Court's decision in Meese
v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987). There a plaintiff who sought to exhibit Canadian films on acid rain
and nuclear war challenged a federal statute that required him to label the films as "foreign
propaganda." Id. at 469. After discussing the wide variety of available definitions of the term
"propaganda," the Supreme Court ultimately-and controversially-concluded that the labeling
requirements did not burden speech (and thus posed no First Amendment problem) because Congress
intended no pejorative connotation when using the term. Id. at 480. Recent government requirements
that cigarette manufacturers include in their advertisements visual images of the dangers of smoking
have also triggered charges that such required disclosures are not "purely factual and uncontroversial,"
given their graphic nature. See R.J. Reynolds v. United States, 2011 WL 5307391, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov.
7, 2011) (describing controversy over whether the graphic-image requirements are "purely factual and
uncontroversial").
3 For examples of government requirements that strike most directly at the heart of speaker
autonomy because they compel individuals to express support for that which they do not believe, see
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down state requirement that dissenting motorist
display state's "Live Free or Die" motto on his car's license plate); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down public schools' requirement that dissenting students
salute the flag).
34 See Whitney D. Pile, The Right to Remain Silent: A First Amendment Analysis of Abortion
Informed Consent Laws, 73 Mo. L. REV. 243 (2008) (arguing "that informed consent laws which force
physicians to disseminate the State's moral ideology fall outside the purview of protections given to
informed consent laws that involve the disclosure of scientific facts"); Post, supra note 28, at 977-78
("[W]hen physicians speak to us as our personal doctors, they must assume a fiduciary obligation
faithfully and expertly to communicate the considered knowledge of the 'medical community.' We
would therefore be concerned if the state could freely, without First Amendment constraint, manipulate
the trustworthy information that we were able to receive from our physicians. This concern does not
reflect anxiety only about the quality of our medical care, for we endow the state with virtually
unlimited discretion to regulate the nature of that care. It instead reflects our wish to receive knowledge
that our doctors can uniquely provide, so that we can decide for ourselves what our medical care ought
to be.").
3s See Post, supra note 28, at 956-57 ("Whether the fetus is a 'human being' is thus understood by
all sides to the abortion controversy to be an essentially contested moral proposition. For South Dakota
to require a physician to 'inform' his patient that she will be terminating the life of a 'human being' is
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linked to depression and suicide - even though that is factually contested
by many in the medical community. 6
In sum, I suggest greater attention to the reasons speakers seek to keep
secrets (or occasionally tell such lies) in assessing the First Amendment
implications of disclosure and disclaimer requirements in a range of
contexts. Such a focus might helpfully inform our choice of the appropriate
level of scrutiny to be applied to such disclosures - for example, we might
be less suspicious of disclosure requirements designed to protect listener
autonomy than those motivated by other governmental purposes. 37 As
argued above, such a focus might also (or instead) help determine whether
a contested disclosure requirement survives a specific level of review,
depending on the justifications offered by both challenger and
government.
For example of what this might mean in practice, consider yet another
contemporary arena in which disclosure requirements are hotly contested.
After concluding that certain pregnancy service centers had engaged in
deceptive speech about the sorts of services they did and did not offer, a
number of local governments enacted ordinances requiring such centers -
among other things39 -- to display signs in their waiting rooms that disclose
consequently not innocent. It deliberately and provocatively incorporates the language of ideological
controversy and forces physicians to affirm the side of those who oppose abortion.").
36 See id. at 961-62 ("[1]t is very likely that [South Dakota's requirements that doctors inform
patients that depression, psychological distress, suicide ideation, and suicide are statistically significant
risks of abortion] require physicians to disclose information that is false."); see also Planned
Parenthood v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (D.S.D. 2009) ("Defendants have provided no
evidence to show that it is generally recognized that having an abortion causes an increased risk of
suicide ideation and suicide.").
3 For example, controversy continues as to the appropriate level of review to apply to disclosure
requirements intended to inform listeners absent a history of deception by regulated commercial
speakers. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009)
(discussing whether rational basis scrutiny or some heightened level of review should apply to
disclosure requirements designed to inform consumer decisionmaking in the absence of a finding of
deception by the regulated commercial speakers). The Supreme Court applies "exacting scrutiny" to
disclosure requirements in the campaign speech context, which requires that the required disclosure be
substantially related to a sufficiently important government interest. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 64 (1976). The Court has
applied strict scrutiny to disclosures required of those engaged in charitable solicitation. See Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n Of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1985).
3 Although I do not claim that the Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis of various
disclosure and disclaimer requirements is entirely coherent, such a focus on comparative autonomy
costs might also explain the Court's holding in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334
(1995), where it struck down Ohio's disclaimer requirement as applied to a single individual circulating
hand-produced political literature. See Briffault, supra note 20, at 991 (characterizing the McIntyre
Court as engaging in a "balancing of informational gains [to listeners] against threats to political
participation [by the individual speaker]").
3 In this discussion, I focus only on the laws' provisions requiring the regulated centers to disclose
objectively verifiable information about their own services. I do not address the First Amendment
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to potential clients that the centers do not provide or refer for birth-control
or abortion services and that they do not have health care professionals on
site.40 In other words, these laws require the centers to disclose objectively
verifiable information in response to legislative findings of deception.
Instead of a rigid and categorical approach in which factual disclosures
to prevent deception may be required of commercial and professional
speakers but not others, here again I suggest we focus instead on the
potential threats posed to listener autonomy. This requires us to ask, more
specifically, why the speakers resist disclosure - i.e., why they seek to
keep secrets and perhaps even tell lies.
So why do the pregnancy crisis centers resist disclosing truthful
information about themselves that their listeners would find valuable - i.e.,
that they don't provide birth control or abortion services or referrals and
they don't have health care professionals on site? One possibility is that
they seek to keep a secret from their targeted listeners to increase their
chances of shaping or steering their listeners' behavior - and if one credits
the local governments' legislative findings of deception,41 we might also
understand them as seeking to tell a type of lie about themselves to achieve
such influence. Just as we saw with respect to campaign disclosures, 42 if
speakers resist disclosure not because they reasonably fear harassment but
because they instead fear that truthful disclosures will limit their message's
implications of provisions in some of these laws that further require the centers to recite the
government's own message. See, e.g., Evergreen Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 2011 WL 2748728,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011) (describing additional requirement that centers must state "that the New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene encourages women who are or who may be
pregnant to consult with a licensed medical provider").
40 See Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (D. Md. 2011); O'Brien v.
Baltimore, 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 815 (D. Md. 2011); Evergreen Ass'n, 2011 WL 2748728, at *4. These
lower courts preliminarily enjoined or struck down these laws on First Amendment grounds; these
decisions are now on appeal. Even while declining to dispute the legislative findings that certain
centers had engaged in deception, the lower courts applied strict scrutiny to strike down the disclosures
as regulating speech outside of both the commercial speech context (because such centers often do not
charge for their services) and the professional speech context (because such centers do not employ
doctors; indeed, the failure to disclose the absence of health care professionals on site when advertising
health care services was one of the centers' allegedly deceptive practices). See Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp.
2d at 462-68 (discussing, and ultimately rejecting, defendant's claims that the disclosure requirements
should be subject to relaxed review as regulations of commercial or professional speech); O'Brien, 768
F. Supp. 2d at 814 (same); Evergreen Ass'n, 2011 WL 2748728, at *9-14 (same).
41 See Evergreen Ass n, 2011 WL 2748728, at *14-15 ("This Court recognizes that the prevention
of deception related to reproductive health care is of paramount importance. Lack of transparency and
delay in prenatal care can gravely impact a woman's health. Unlicensed ultrasound technicians
operating in pseudo-medical settings can spawn significant harms to pregnant, at-risk women who
believe they are receiving medical care. Plaintiffs' categorical denial of the existence of any such
deception-and refusal to acknowledge the potential misleading nature of certain conduct-feigns
ignorance of the obvious.").
42 See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text.
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ability to influence listeners' choices, such disclosure laws may
appropriately seek to ameliorate the threat that would otherwise be posed
to listeners' autonomy.43
CONCLUSION
This essay urges greater attention to why the government seeks to
require certain disclosures and why speakers may resist. We should
understand disclosure and disclaimer requirements as more likely to
further, rather than frustrate, First Amendment values when they regulate
speakers who seek to keep secrets (and occasionally tell lies) to manipulate
listeners' choices and thus threaten their autonomy.
43 For a contrary view, see Mark L. Rienzi, The History and Constitutionality of Maryland's
Pregnancy Speech Regulations, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 223 (2010).
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